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VALUATION Or DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS' INTEREST IN A MERGED OR
CONSOLIDATED COpoRATION-Flexibility of the common law has been the
guarantee of its existence. Courts have not been impervious to change. Broad,
general principles enunciated in prior decisions have been limited to the par-
ticular circumstances of those cases, and obiter dicta have been denounced as
mere surplusage when new factual situations demanded application of new
principles if justice was to be accomplished. In general, the law, conservative
in its conception, has gradually reacted to changed economic conditions and kept
pace with the ebb and flow of human activity. The stupendous and precipitant
rise of the corporate form, however, has introduced new problems, so varied
and novel that courts have found considerable difficulty in applying common
law concepts, probably because of their tendency to grope for standards of gen-
eral application, rather than a recognition of the necessity of determining only
the peculiar right litigated as between the particular parties. A tradition of
individualistic law cannot be molded readily to determine problems affecting
interests of shareholders as a group, and this is quite apposite to the problems
arising when there is an attempt to effect a merger or consolidation against the
wish of minority shareholders.
When the prevailing form of business enterprise was a partnership, com-
posed of three or four members, the rule was developed that the business could
not be sold nor combined with another without the consent of all the partners.'
As the corporate form began to supersede the partnership, the shareholders were
few in number, and the courts, recognizing that the corporation was merely the
partnership with a few rights superadded by the legislature, adopted the rule
that consent of all shareholders was a condition precedent to the validity 2 of a
sale of all the corporate assets,3 a merger 4 or a consolidation. '  The share-
holder had an interest in continuing as a member of the group which interest the
courts would not allow to be taken from him without his consent; such a taking
being considered as tantamount to a conversion of his shares.6 Without such
a rule, a member of the shareholding group might have been deprived of his
membership at the whim and caprice of the majority of the shareholders.7 As
the corporation became the favored type of business organization, ownership
became widely diffused and the shareholding group was subject to constant flux.
The unanimity rule was obviously inadequate to deal with the situation where
one shareholder out of thousands, the owner of one share out of millions, might
prevent a sale or combination advantageous to the corporation. Whereas the
See LUiDLY, PARTNERsHIP (9th ed. 1924) 405. The Uniform Partnership Act pro-
vides in section 9 (3) : "Unless authorized by the other partners or unless they have aban-
doned the business, one or more but less than all the partners have no authority to: . . .
(b) Dispose of the goodwill of the business, (c) Do any other act which would make itimpossible to carry on the ordinary business of a partnership, . .
= I. e., the transaction will not be enjoined at the instance o.f a minority shareholder.
SMeyerhoff v. Banker's Securities, Inc., 15 N. J. ]Eq. 76, 147 Atl. io5 (1929); Abbot v.
American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. Ch. 578 (N. Y. 1861) ; Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land
& Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 Pac. 1044 (1928). See also Warren, Voluntary Transfers ofCorporate Undertakings (1917) 30 H-ARv. L. R~v. 335-
'Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct. 209 (1920).
Or the formation of a holding company. American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 29o Fed.
896 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923) ; Murrin v. Archbald Consol. Coal Co., 232 N. Y. 541, 134 N. E. 563
(1921).
6 Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., supra note 3, at 274, 270 Pac. at 1054.
For a discussion of devices for diluting stock participations, see Berle, Corporate De-
iaces for Diluting Stock Participations (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 1239.
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majority might have forced a sale of the minority interest had the unanimity
rule not been invoked, the minority might now, with the aid of the rule, compel
the majority to buy them out at an exorbitant price or register their dissent and
prevent the consummation of the proposed plan." This situation led to the adop-
tion by a few courts of the so-called modern rule that the minority will not be
permitted to prevent a sale or combination plan which is fairly made.9 In most
of the states the situation called for statutory reformation, and at the present
time thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia and the Philippine Islands pro-
vide for the sale, transfer or combination of a corporation by approval of less
than all of the shareholders.'
0
When at the time of incorporation the statute or articles of association
expressly authorize merger and consolidation, such provisions become part of
the contract between the shareholders and the corporation, and a combination
may be effected by compliance with the provisions of the statute or articles of
association." Where the authorizing statute is passed subsequent to the incor-
poration of the enterprise, the shareholders are bound, if the statutory require-
ments are satisfied, when the legislature has reserved the power to alter, amend
or repeal the articles of association.1 2 Though this privilege is reserved, where
the consolidation would work a material modification of the purposes and charac-
ter of the corporate business, the statute does not affect existing corporations.'8
If the legislature has not reserved the privilege, subsequent statutes or amend-
ments to the articles validating corporate combination give no added power to
existing corporations.' Of the forty-one statutes mentioned, thirty-two author-
ize merger or consolidation by affirmative sanction of less than all the sharehold-
ers; the other nine statutes refer to the sale, leasing" or exchange of all the cor-
porate assets. A merger or consolidation would seem necessarily to involve an
exchange of all the assets. Whether the courts will so decide is conjectural, it
having been held that such a statute does not apply to a consolidation. 15
Seven of the statutes authorizing consolidation 18 and one of the statutes
authorizing the transfer of all the property 1" provide no remedy for non-assent-
ing shareholders. Since the statutes have destroyed the right of the minority
to prevent consolidation or other fundamental change in the corporate structure,
courts might construe the right to receive the value of their shares as ancillary to
the new right of the majority, a recompense for the deprivation of the minority's
common law right, or the combination plan might be considered unfair in
absence of a provision providing for the payment in cash to dissentients of the
value of their shares. Some courts have allowed actions by dissentients for the
8 See In re Timmis, 200 N. Y. 177, 181, 93 N. E. 522, 523 (I91O).
9 Nave-McCord Mercantile Co. v. Ranney, 29 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 8th, I28) ; Beiden-
kopf v. Des Moines Lifel Ins. Co., 16o Iowa 629, 142 N. W. 434 (1913); Halpern v. Gra-
bosky, 296 Pa. 1o8, 145 Atl. 834 (1929) ; Cohen v. Big Stone Gap Iron Co., iii Va. 468, 69
S. E. 359 (1910). Cf. Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 73 Mass. 393, 404 (1856): "At
common law, the right of corporations, acting by a majority of their stockholders, to sell
their property is absolute, is not limited as to objects, circumstances or quantity."
"For the various statutes, see infra notes 26 to 32 inclusive.
"8 THompsoN, CotPoRATroNs (3d ed. 1927) § 6032.
'Hale v. Chesire R. R., 161 Mass. 443, 37 N. E. 307 (1894). For a full discussion of
the effect of subsequently enacted legislation, see Dodd, Dissenting Shareholders and Amend-
inents to Corporate Charters (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 584.
'Kenosha, Rockford & Rhode Island R. R. v. Marsh, I7 Wis. 13 (1863).
'Thomas v. Railroad Co., IOI U. S. 71 (1879) ; Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. R., 3o
Pa. 42 (1858) ; cf. Tuttle v. Michigan Air Line R. R., 35 Mich. 247 (1877).
' Norton v. Union Traction Co., 183 Ind. 666, IiO N. E. 113 (1915). A different attitude
is apparent in Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 156 Atl. 183 (Del. Ch. 1931), where it is
said, at 188: "While a consolidation is quite distinct from a sale, yet, from the viewpoint of
the constituent companies, a sale of assets is in substance involved."
"Those of Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, Utah and West Virginia.
17 That of Wisconsin.
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value of their shares although the statute was silent, 8 but the weight of authority
is to the effect that payment is not an inherent right of shareholdership and
therefore exists only where the legislatures have specifically provided therefor. 9
Though the latter rule appears theoretically sound, it is to be regretted that the
statutes did not, in all cases, give the right to dissenting shareholders to compel
payment of the value of their shares if they did not desire to join the acquiring
corporation. When the statute authorizes payment, the question arises whether
this remedy is exclusive. An affirmative answer compels the conclusion that the
provision would then be unconstitutional as confiscatory 20 except where the
right of eminent domain exists. The California Code,2 however, provides that
litigation is limited to suits to determine whether the requisite affirmative vote
of authorization has been given. In absence of such statute, it is held that pay-
ment is not made an exclusive remedy.2 2  Where the merger or consolidation
agreement is unfair and a fraud upon the minority, the proposed arrangement
may be set aside.23 If consummated, the acquiring corporation holds the prop-
erty of the constituent company upon constructive trust. A dissenting share-
holder is not required to exercise his option of surrendering his shares for their
cash value until he has been given a fair opportunity of joining in the proposed
change subject to conditions, proper both at law and in equity.24  In Pennsyl-
vania, the dissenting shareholder is not limited to an action at law in pursuance
of the remedy given by the appraisal statute, but may sue in equity to enforce
payment of the value of his shares2' Adequacy of the remedy at law, however,
would appear to be a complete defense to the action in equity.
The provisions for determination of the value of the shares of dissentients
display a considerable lack of uniformity. The usual difficulties attendant upon
statutes inartistically drawn abound. The statutes may be roughly divided into
two groups, those specifying that "value" is to be paid, and those providing for
"market value". Of the "value" group, twelve statutes provide that "value"
of the shares is to be paid 2,1; nine provide for payment of the "fair cash value" 2 7 ;
I Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., supra note 3; Southern Mut. Aid Ass'n v.
Blount, 1i1 Va. 214, 70 S. E. 487 (1911). In absence of statute, dissentients have been
allowed payment for their shares. Paterson v. Shattuck Arizona Copper Co., 186 Minn. 611,
244 N. W. 281 (1932), 81 U. OF PA. L. RV. 219; Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. Co., supra
note I4; International & G. N. R. R. v. Bremond, 53 Tex. 96 (188o); cf. State v. Bailey, I6
Ind. 46 (1861).
15 FLETCHER, CYCLoPEDIA OF CoRPORATioNs (Perm. ed. 1932) § 7164. ' Nugent v. The
Supervisors, ig Wall. 241 (U. S. 1873) ; Mayfield v. Alton Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 198 Ill. 528,
65 N. E. OO (19o2) ; Traer v. Lucas Prospecting Co., 124 Iowa 107, 99 N. W. 29o (1904).
o See Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment (193o) 15CoRx. L. Q. 42o, 427.
' CA_. CIrv. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 369; cf. § 44 (2)' and § 54 of Mich. Pub. Acts 1931,
No. 327.
' Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders (1927) 27 COL. L. Rav. 547, 557; Goodis-
son v. North American Securities Co., 4o Ohio App. 85, 178 N. E. 29 (1931).
' Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o6); Colgate v.
United States Leather Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 67 Atl. 657 (19o7) ; Tanner v. Lindell Ry., i8o
Mo. 1, 79 S. W. 155 (193o).
" Colgate v. United States Leather Co., supra note 23; Outwater v. Public Service
Corp'n of N. J., 1O3 N. J. Eq. 461, 143 Atl. 729 (1928).
'Barnett v. Philadelphia Market Co., 218 Pa. 649, 67 Ati. 912 (19o7). Contra: Spencer
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 137 N. C. 107, 49 S. E. 96 (igo4).
'3CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 3466; DEL. REv. CODE (1915) c. 65, § 61, as amended by
Del. Laws 1927, c. 85, §20; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 29-155; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns,
Supp. 1929) § 4856.2; ME. Ray. STAT. (1930) c. 56, § 66; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 56,
§ 46; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 4568; N. Y. STocic CoRPoRAIoN LAW (1923) §§ 21, 87, as
amended by N. Y. Laws 1924, c. 441, § 6; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 1224 (c) ; S.
C. Cirv. CODE (1932) § 7759; VT. GEN. LAws (1917) § 4938, as amended by Vt. Laws 1919,
No. 125, § 2; PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CoRPoRATION Acr OF i9o6, § 2832, as amended by Act of
1928, § 13.
IArk. Laws 1931, c. 255, § 63; CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 369; FLA. Comp. LAWS
(927) § 6564; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1132; Mich. Laws 1931, No. 327, § 54; MINN.
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five stipulate for the "fair value" 28; and Rhode Island requires payment of
the "full and fair value".29 In this group, there is no substantial disparity
of terminology. The full value and the fair value would be required in all cases
as well as payment in cash. The second group may be divided into statutes
providing for "market value" 30 and those providing for the "full market
value".81 Here again no substantial distinction exists. But whether the same
criteria will be applied in both groups is problematical. The statutes of Ala-
bama 82 and Tennessee 3 use the terms "value" and "market value" interchange-
ably, a manifestation of inaccurate draftsmanship. In these two states, at least,
the two terms must be construed to be synonymous. The New Jersey court,3"
in approving the report of appraisers evaluating shares of dissentients under
statute calling for their "full market value", determined that market value of the
shares was the proper basis, and that value based upon a pro rata share of the
corporation's assets properly valued is unsound. But, in Outwater v. Public
Service Corporation,3 the same court, when it was contended that sales were
too infrequent and casual to give a market value to the shares, suggested that the
argument that proof of intrinsic value should have been resorted to might have
been persuasive had that line of proof been introduced. In Pennsylvania, where
the statute also provides for payment of the "full market value", a dissentient
may pursue his remedy in equity to enforce payment of the value of his shares,
in which case recovery is not limited to market value if the value as measured
by assets is greater.3 6 Courts certainly should make a distinction between value
and market value. Market value should be considered in determining value but
ought not to be conclusive. Ten of the statutes provide that the value of the
shares shall be ascertained without reference to any appreciation or depreciation
in consequence of the consolidation. In New York, where there is no statutory
provision on this subject, it has been decided that the enhanced value of his
shares by reason of the proposition which the dissentient has disapproved is not
to be allowed.3 7 However, where the consolidation plan was not fair to minority
shareholders, any appreciation in value arising from the transfer will be assigned
to the dissentients since the majority may not gain a profit resulting from a vio-
lation of their duty.3  The Illinois statute, while stipulating that the shares
STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 7457-14; Ne. ComP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 164o; OH IO GmE. CODE
(Page, 1931) § 8623-72, as amended by Ohio Laws 1931, pp. 66, 68; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
193o § 3822.
ILL REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1931) c. 32, § 73; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 35;
N. H. PuB. LAWS (1926) c. 225, § 54; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 25-234; D. C. CODE (1928)
§ 639 (d), as amended by D. C. Laws 1931, No. 619.
R. I. GEN. LAws (1923) c. 248, § 56, as amended by R. I. Laws 1932, c. 1941, § 5.
' 9Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 558.
a N. J. Comp. STAT. (191o) p. 1661, and (Supp. 1924) p. 683; N. M. STAT. ANN.
(Courtright, 1929) § 32-217, 218, I2OI, i2O3; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. I5, § 425.
The dissenting shareholder is to be paid the actual value of his shares, and may apply
for the appointment of appraisers to appraise the full narket vale; if the court is satisfied
that the appraisement is not the true market value, it may enter an, order for the true value
thereof. A.A. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 7043.
' Dissentients are entitled to the faie market value of their shares; if a fair value can-
not be agreed upon, the court may determine the vale, and upon payment of the fair cash
value, the shares shall be transferred to the new corporation. TmN. CODE (1932) § 3752.
In re Capital Stock of Morris Canal & Banking Co., lO4 N. J. L. 526, 141 Atl. 784
(1928) ; Prall v. U. S. Leather Co., 6 N. J. Misc. 967, 143 At. 382 (1928).
Supra note 24.
9 ' Petry v. Harwood Electric Co., 280 Pa. 142, 124 Att. 302 (924) ; Ferrando v. U. S.
Nat Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 307 Pa. 25, 16o Atl. 716 (1932) ; Nice Ball Bearing Co. v. Mort-
gage Building & Loan Ass'n, Pa. Sup. Ct, Jan. 16, 1933, (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 872,
873.
73 Matter of Fulton, In re Clark's Will, 131 Misc. 15I, 226 N. Y. Supp. 141 (1928), aff'd,
227 App. Div. 785, 237 N. Y. Supp. 745 (1929), modified, 257 N. Y. 487, 178 N. E. 766 (i31).as Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., supra note 23.
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of non-assenting shareholders are to be valued without regard to appreciation
or depredation resulting from the plan, provides that the acquiring corporation
shall be obligated to purchase the shares "together with all rights and interests
thereby represented, including all cash or securities or other benefits accruing
to such share or shares, from or by reason of the sale, lease, merger or consolida-
tion".39
A few sporadic provisions remain to be considered. In Oregon, dissentients
are given the remedy only when the consideration for the sale or transfer is not
wholly lawful money of the United States. The Pennsylvania statute requires
the appraisers to estimate the damages to the non-assenting shareholder by the
consolidation and to appraise the shares at their full market value, the corpora-
tion then being given an election to pay either. In Ohio, "unless the articles
otherwise provide", dissentients are to be paid. Even in absence of such a pro-
vision there is no valid reason why the articles cannot prevent dissentients from
availing themselves of the statutory right. Where the articles provide for con-
solidation without the necessity of buying out the minority, shareholders must
be deemed, when they purchased their shares, to have consented to such provision
as a portion of the contract between them and the corporation. The Louisiana
Act states that consolidation may be effected by approval of two-thirds of the
shares of each class "unless otherwise provided in the articles". The articles,
then, might provide that a three-fourths vote or a unanimous vote is essential.
This would also seem to be permissible in absence of specific stipulation in the
statute, though some courts would show reluctance to uphold the requirement of
unanimity in all situations. The Louisiana statute also contains the unique pro-
vision that dissenting shareholders may demand the value of their shares only
where the proposal has been adopted by less than eighty per cent. of the share-
holders.
Determination of the various factors influencing value 40 which are to be
considered with regard to a given state of facts has been left to the discretion
of the courts. The statutes give little assistance in elucidating the elements
comprising "fair cash value" or "full market valu&'. Courts have felt that, since
the corporation was to survive, though in a different form, the dissentients are
entitled, not only to their aliquot share of the assets as upon a dissolution, but to
any additional value of the corporation as a going concern.4 . Where the statute
prescribes that the market value of the shares is to be paid, if the security is listed
on the Stock Exchange, ascertainment of the market value will be comparatively
simple. Any effect on quotations resultant from the merger or consolidation
agreement will have to be eliminated, but this can be done by comparison with
quotations of the shares before the proposal was made. When the market is in
a state of normality, no resort to extraneous factors or conditions need be made.
But when the condition of the market is unsteady, or when there is unjustified
inflation or deflation, present market quotations can be influential only insofar
as they reflect a reasonable basis for estimating what would be the market value
of the shares in absence of abnormalities. Consideration must then be given to
the factors upon which market value is founded-the past record and present
reputation of the management, stability of earning power, rate of return on the
investment, and prospective earning power. In Kentucky and New Mexico, it
is provided that dissenting shareholders shall be paid the market value of the
shares, but this shall not be less than book value of the shares according to the
m ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, i931) c. 32, § 73.
'o See Robinson, Dissenting Shareholders: Their Right to Dividends and the Valuation
of Their Shares (1932) 3z Col. L. REv. 6o; Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Staekholders
Under Appraisal Statutes (93) 45 HAzv. L. REv. 233; HARTMNn, FAiR VALUE (I920),
discussing primarily this term as used by utility commissions.
'American Seating Co. v. Bullard, supra note 5; cf. Cole v. Wells, 224 Mass. 5o4, 113
N. E. 189 (I916).
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last balance sheet of the corporation. Whether book value is any measure of
actual value is controversial. In Borg v. International Silver Co.,4 2 consideration
of book value as influential in determining actual value was declared to be falla-
cious. Book value has also been held too intangible to be sufficient, by itself, to
show that a purchase of corporate assets based upon market value of the shares is
unreasonable or fraudulent.48 Earnings are some indication of the value of the
investment of the shareholders and book value represents accumulated earnings
added to the amount paid in on the shares. Book value, then, is the estimate of
the total investment of shareholders in the corporation, and in absence of good-
will among the assets would be some evidence of what shareholders would be
likely to receive were the corporation dissolved.
In Oregon, 44 the dissentient is to be paid in cash the fair value of his interest,
based upon his proportionate share of the "reasonable and fair value of the net
assets" of the corporation. The other "value" statutes do not specify a valuation
basis. In Cole v. Wells,45 "value" was interpreted as including not only the
market price of the shares but their intrinsic value, to be ascertained by a valua-
tion of the excess of all the assets over the liabilities. In appraising realty owned
by the corporation, ten per cent. is to be allowed for plottage. Five per cent.
extra is allowed where the contiguous properties are available for the "best pos-
sible use," but this allowance will not be granted where the best possible use of
the properties will require removal of a structure now upon the land.46 Evidence
of the par value of the shares of the acquiring corporation given in exchange for
the shares of the absorbed corporation may be considered in appraising the
minority shares,47 but the fact that the value set by the appraisers is greater than
the pro rata share of the proceeds of the transfer is no objection to their report.48
In Seaich v. Mason-Seantan Trans. Co.,49 the New York court modified a valu-
ation based upon the proportionate share of the corporation's net assets, and
allowed, as an asset, goodwill, ascertained by multiplying average net profits, less
interest on capital invested in the business, by a number of years, to be ascer-
tained in each case by reference to the nature and character of the particular
enterprise.50
11 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 2d, I925).
" Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 141 Atl. 425 (1928).
"OmE. CODE ANN. (193o) § 25-234.
Supra note 41.
"Erlanger v. New York Theatre Co., 206 App. Div. 148, 200 N. Y. Supp. 696 (i923),
modified, 237 N. Y. 159, 142 N. E. 57I (1923).
'Wunsch v. Consolidated Laundry Co., 116 Wash. 44, 198 Pac. 383 ('92').
I it re Bickerton, 196 App. Div. 231, 187 N. Y. Supp. 267, aff'd, 232 N. Y. I, 133 N. E.
41 (921).
17o App. Div. 686, 156 N. Y. Supp. 579 (1915) ; af'd, 219 N. Y. 634, 114 N. E. io83
(1916).
'The appraisers had determined the preferred shares to be worth $88.43 per share,
$15,298.39 for the 873 shares of respondent The assets, as of the date when respondent ob-
jected, were determined to be $1,201,728.14, including valuation of the goodwill at $366,707.52.
The Company earned $289,oo5.98 during its 2Iy months of corporate existence or a yearly
average of $122,235.84. This was multiplied by three to arrive at the value of goodwill. The
court modified the goodwill figure by deducting interest on the capital invested in the busi-
ness. The assets as found by the appraisers less their goodwill figure amounted to $835,-
020.62, six per cent. of which amount is $5o,ioi.24. This is deducted from the average net
profits of $122,235.84 leaving a balance of $72,13460. Multiplying this figure by three, good-
will is found to be $286,4o3.8o and the assets $1,051,424.42. Subtracting from this amount
the conceded liabilities of $457,8o9.89 and an overvaluation of taxicabs of $84,099.60, net
assets become $509,514.93. This made the value of petitioner's shares $6o.57 each, or
$iO,478.6i as finally found by the court. It is submitted that this result is incorrect. The
assets as found by the appraisers less the amount allowed by them as goodwill are $835,020.62.
This figure reduced by the conceded liabilities of $457,809.89 and taxicab overvaluation of
$84,099.60 is equal to $293,111.13. This amount is the net asset value exclusive of goodwill,
in other words, the capital invested. Six per cent. of this is $17,586.67, the interest on capi-
tal invested. Average earnings, $122,235.84, less interest on invested capital, is $8o4,649.17
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It has sometimes been stated that a sale of all the corporate assets or a merger
or consolidation effects a practical dissolution 5 of the corporation, but as far as
determination of value is concerned, this statement has been repudiated by Matter
of Fulton,5 2 in which the rule for distribution of surplus between preferred and
common shareholders upon a dissolution was held inapplicable where there had
been a transfer of the corporation as a going concern. The court decided that
the preferred shareholders had no interest in the surplus since their shares were
preferred only as to dividends and these had been paid regularly. The accumu-
lated earnings in the surplus account therefore might have been paid to the
holders of the common shares and any equity in the surplus account belonged
to them. Unless the preferred shareholders would be denied participation in the
surplus if a dissolution of the corporation were effected, it is difficult to justify
the result. The dissenting shareholder has an interest in the corporation and
the maintenance of its status as a going concern. He should be entitled at least
to what he would receive if the corporation were dissolved rather than merely
absorbed. However, transfer of the corporate property without his consent gives
him, in addition, the added right to share in any surplus value represented by
that vague generality, going concern value. The case is also interesting because
of the weight it attaches to earning power as a factor in the determination of
value. By way of dictum, the court states that investment value of shares is to
be considered in determining their value. This in turn is dependent upon the
rate of return, the security affording regularity of dividend payment, the record
of the corporation and its prospects for the future. In Jones v. Missouri-Edison
Elec. Co.,53 the master capitalized the net income of the fourth year after the
consolidation at seven per cent. and discounted this amount back to the date of
the consolidation. The report was held erroneous on the ground that net income
for the first three years should have been considered, and that capitalized
income was not by itself the test of value but should have been considered along
with other evidence of value such as the sales value of the shares.
The sparseness of case material and the failure of the statutes to elucidate
a procedure for ascertaining the dissenting shareholder's interest leave much to
speculation. New circumstances will demand additional considerations. Mean-
while the conflict among the various standards of value remains. Selection of a
single method to the exclusion of all others may be expeditious but at the same
time is very likely to lead to inaccuracy. For this reason the statutes prescribing
market value as the test are unsatisfactory. The market is usually in either a
bullish or bearish condition. Over a period of time the variations tend to be
ironed out, but in valuation the problem is to ascertain the value as of a particular
time. Where there is a ready market, value based upon market prices will not
give the dissentient anything he does not already have, since he may dispose of
his shares in the market, and any recession of the market price due to the increase
in supply brought about by his desire to sell will be more than offset by the
saving of the expenses of prosecuting his statutory right of appraisal. Where
there is no ready market, there will probably be no substantial facts upon which
which multiplied by three is equal to $313,947.51, the goodwill o.f the company. Goodwill
plus the value of net assets exclusive of goodwill amount to $607,058.64, the total net asset
value. Petitioner's pro rat share of this is $72.16 per share or $12,483.68, more than $2ooo
in excess of the amount finally found by the court. Proper application of the language used
by the court in its opinion requires this result.
'People v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269, 32 N. E. 54 (1892) ; In re Timmis, sup'ra note 8;
Murrin v. Archbald Consol. Coal Co., supra note 5; see Cole v. Wells, supra note 41, at 513,
113 N. E. at I91.
Supra note 37.
233 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). This case traveled back and forth between the Dis-
trict Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals for eleven years before finally adjudicated.
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to base the estimate of market value. A maximum and minimum from which
to start calculations appear to be desirable. Two of the statutes 54 set the mini-
mum at book value as of the last balance sheet. It would be better to place
dissolution value as the minimum, book value to be considered as evidence thereof.
Some statutes provide that the demand by the shareholder for payment is to
be accompanied by a statement of the amount considered by the shareholder to
be the fair value of his shares. If the corporation is not satisfied that this is the
fair value of the shares it is to notify the dissentient of what it considers to be
such fair value. Provisions of this sort in the statutes, with the additional re-
quirement that the estimate be accompanied by a statement of the facts upon
which such value is based, might be conducive to settlement of the dispute by
compromise; if not, the two estimates would be a starting point from which the
appraisers could work, using market value, asset or intrinsic value, present and
prospective earning power, and the sale or exchange value used in the agreement
of transfer insofar as they tend to show at what point between the two extremes
actual value is situated. There is no single, self-sufficient test of value. The
various factors must all be considered and weighed with respect to the peculiar
circumstances of each particular case.
An interesting problem arises in determining at what time the dissentient
ceases to be a shareholder and becomes a creditor of the corporation. The Illinois
statute provides for the payment of interest at the rate of five per cent. from the
date of the consummation of the sale, lease, merger or consolidation. From
this provision it would seem to be a justifiable implication that rights of share-
holdership cease on the day from which interest begins to run. Four of the
statutes stipulate that upon demand by the dissentient for the value of his shares
he ceases to be a shareholder.5 6 In Ohio, it is provided that, if prior to the con-
summation or abandonment of the proposal, dividends are paid to the share-
holders of the same class as those dissenting, the amount which dissentients
would have received but for their dissent shall be paid to them as a credit upon
the amount to be paid for their shares.57 Ohio also provides that the court in
confirming the award of the appraisers shall provide for the payment of interest
at the rate of six per cent. from whatever date it shall set. In Paterson v. Shat-
tuck Arizona Copper Co.,58 since the corporation was formed prior to the enact-
ment of the appraisal statute, it did not apply, but the dissentients being less than
one per cent. of the total shareholding body, the court refused to enjoin the merger
but gave the petitioners the option to take shares in the acquiring company on the
basis of a fair exchange, or the value of their shares at the highest market
or intrinsic value between the time of the consolidation and the trial, with interest
from the date fixed for determining the value. Under this view, the dissentient re-
mains a shareholder until the date which he chooses as the time from which value
is to be calculated. The Minnesota statute, however, provides that value as of the
day before the authorization vote is to be the standard. When the case arises un-
der the statute, there will be no choice of the date for determining the value, but
the case is still authority for stipulating that interest is to run from the date men-
tioned in the statute as the base rather than from the date of payment. This
would intimate that all rights except the right of payment cease when the consoli-
dation is authorized. In Matter of Erlanger," it was determined that interest
Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 883b-3; N. M. STAT. ANr. (Courtright, 1929) § 32-1203.
ILT. RLT. STAT. (Cahill, i3i), c. 32, §73.
FA. CoMP. LAWS (1927) § 6564; NEv. ComP. LAWS (Hillyer, I929) § 1640; N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 1224 (c); PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CoRpoRAToN Acr OF i9o6,
§ 28/2, as amended by Act of 1928, § 13.




was to run only from the time of confirmation of the award; but in the unre-
ported case of Ames v. Godchaux Sugars, Inc.,60 the corporation had not fared
well since the consolidation and the court was reluctant to consider dissenting
shareholders as affected by such losses. It therefore decided that the dissentients
had no right to dividends between the time of dissent and confirmation of the
award. This result is untenable since it refuses to recognize that the shareholder
has the important right to share in profits and refuses to recognize him as a
creditor entitled to interest. The shareholder's demand for the value of his shares
is also a notification by the shareholder to the corporation that he no longer
wishes to be considered a member of the shareholding body. Upon such demand,
his rights of shareholdership should cease unless he later withdraws his dis-
approval of the corporate action and desires reinstatement as a member of the
new group. The time between authorization of the corporate action and the date
by which the shareholder must have registered his demand is so short that likeli-
hood of alteration in his status as a shareholder is negligible. Since most of the
statutes provide that value is to be ascertained as of the day before the corporate
action is approved, it is submitted that, to provide for all cases, the date of
authorization should be considered the time from which dissentients cease to have
the rights, privileges and liabilities of shareholdership, and the time from which
interest on the value of their shares is calculated.
The problem of determining the value of the interest of the dissenting
shareholder is manifestly perplexing and intricate. Value, itself, intangible and
fluctuating, must be determined largely in the discretion of the appraisers and
courts of review. In thirty-one states, the right to payment has been provided
by statute. That these statutes are largely unsatisfactory and inadequate has
been demonstrated.61 The desirability of a uniform act 62 expounding the me-
chanics of valuation, enumerating the factors to be contemplated, and elucidating
the status of the dissentient pending payment, cannot be overestimated. The
paucity of judicial interpretations of problems involved in this type of valuation
lends weight to the efficacy of such a statute. Uniformity of construction is more
readily attainable when the problem of interpretation is not hampered by limita-
tions in prior adjudications. During the past decade, merger and consolidation
have been on trial. Further development was delayed by the sudden deflation.
Reconstruction of the corporate structure will become more imminent as the
recession of activity fades into the recovery phase. Corporate combination will
be essential to eradicate the disastrous consequences of destructive competition. 3
The trial and test of combination have shown advantages too numerous to prevent
its growth from continuing and accelerating. The legislature and judiciary must
meet its advance with a vigilance designed to protect the interests of those whose
importance may be forgotten in its ascendancy.
E.C.F.
' Affirmed without opinion in 228 App. Div. 8oi, 239 N. Y. Supp. 917 (i93o). For a
full discussion of the case, see Robinson, supra note 40, at 62.
An exposition of other statutory deficiencies is contained in Levy, rupra note 2o, and
Lattin, supra note 40. See Comment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 952 for an interesting discussion
of capital reclassification under the appraisal statutes.
See Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law (1931) 19
CALIF. L. REv. 465, particularly at 482; HANDB001K OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoM-
M.IssIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (I927) 779 et seq. The UNIFORM Busnuss CoR-
PORATION Act, §§ 42, 48, as approved by the National Conference in 1928, has very brief pro-
vision for non-assenting minority shareholders. 9 U. L. A. 37, 94, 98; HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CO aISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1928) 334, 404, 409.
No reference is made to the status of the shareholder between dissent and payment; nor is
any method for determining value prescribed.
' The Supreme Court has recently enunciated a more liberal attitude in dealing with
combinations effected to eliminate detrimental corporate rivalry. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 53 Sup. Ct. 471 (1933), (1933) U. OF PA. L. REv. ioo6.
